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Articles
B. G. Ramcharan*

The Emerging Jurisprudence
of The Human Rights
Committee

I. Introduction

Referring to the role of the Human Rights Committee in the
examination of reports submitted by States parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Canadian
representative in the Third Committee of the General Assembly in
1966, expected that the Committee would "examine, analyse,
appraise and evaluate the reports ... in a searching and critical

fashion." ' After two years, during which five sessions of the
Human Rights Committee were held, how does the Committee
measure up to this standard? This will be the main inquiry of the
present article during the course of which the following aspects will
also be kept in mind: (1) What are the basic lines of approach of the
Human Rights Committee in discharging its functions? (2) How is
the Committee seeking to ensure the fullest attainable compliance
with the Covenant and its Optional Protocol? (3) To what extent can
it be said that the Committee is following a judicial approach or
judicial standards in the discharge of its functions? (4) Is the
Committee pursuing a liberal or a conservative approach in applying
the provisions of the Covenant and the Protocol?
II. The ObligationofStates partiesand the Functionsof the Human
Rights Committee

Under the Covenant each State party undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant without any
distinction of any kind. In article 40, the States parties undertake to
submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect
to the rights recognized in the Covenant and on the progress made in
the enjoyment of those rights, within one year of the entry into force
of the Covenant for the States parties concerned and thereafter
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada. All views
expressed in this article are those of the author in his purely personal capacity.
1. Prof. R. St. J. MacDonald, A/C.3/SR. 1426, para. 22
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whenever the Human Rights Committee so requests. Reports should
also indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the
implementation of the Covenant. The word "measures" was meant
to have "broad connotations and to comprise all spheres of
activities" including legislation, judicial and other actions. 2 The
"progress made" refers to the "progress . . . made as a result of
the measures adopted by States", and does not refer to the
progressive implementation of the rights contained in the
Covenant. 3
Article 28 of the Covenant provides for the establishment of a
Human Rights Committee consisting of 18 members, who are
persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the
field of human rights. This Committee is entrusted with: (i) the
"study" of reports submitted by States parties and the making of
"general comments" thereon; (ii) the consideration of communications by a State party to the Covenant under article 41 complaining
that another State party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
Covenant; 4 (iii) the Teceipt and consideration of communicatios
submitted under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, and the
presentation of its "views thereon". (Under the Optional Protocol a
State party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the Protocol
recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee,
subject to certain conditions, to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction, who claim to be
victims of a violation by that State party of any of the rights set forth
in the Covenant.)
III. The Approach of the HumanRights Committee
The Human Rights Comnmittee began operations in 1977 and has so
far held five sessions. In accordance with article 45 of the
Covenant, the Committee has, thus far, submitted two annual
reports to the General Assembly of the United Nations. 5
The Committee considers itself an expert body mindful, inter
alia, of judicial, fact-finding, conciliation, diplomatic and political
elements in its functions. At its first session the question arose
2. A/C.3/SR. 1126-1427
3. A/C.3/SR. 1427, paras. 45 and 46
4. The procedure of inter-State complaints entered into force on March 28, 1979.
It has been accepted so far by the following States: Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Federal Republic of; Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
5. A/32/44; A/33/40
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whether the Committee is a judicial body. One of its members, Mr.6
Uribe Vargas considered that its "work was of a judicial nature".
Other members also referred expressly or impliedly to judicial
elements in its functions. However, another member, Mr. Graefrath
"did not share the view that the work of the Committee could be
compared with that of a court... Unlike a court, the Committee
was not required to make any judgements, 7 but simply to consider
and comment on reports and to act as a coniliatory body 8 in dealing
with complaints and communications. '" 9 Mr. Suy, (United Nations
Legal Counsel) "believed that the Human Rights Committee was
neither a legislative nor a judicial body and that every expert body
was sui generis". 0
The Committee has underlined its independence by pointing out,
in its first report, that it is not a subsidiary organ of the United
Nations but a conventional organ established by the States parties to
the Covenant. 1 1 The approach which has prevailed in the
Committee thus far is a pragmatic one. Issues are faced as they
arise, and approaches and techniques adopted which are likely to
produce the best attainable results.
The approach of the Committee in its relationship with
governments is "to develop a constructive dialogue with each State
party in regard to the implementation of the Covenant and thereby
contribute to mutual understanding and peaceful and friendly
relations among nations in accordance with the Charter of the
12
United Nations."
6. CCPR/SR. 6, para. 72
7. Cp. Mrs. Harris (USA), A/C.3/SR. 1417, para. 53: "The role of the Human
Rights Committee was essentially to act as a conciliation body available to the
States concerned; however, it was not competent to determine whether a State party
had failed to fulfil its commitments". Similary, Mr. Paolini (France)
A/C.3/SR. 1418, para. 7, "The Committee should limit itself to general
comments".
8. Cp. Mr. Hanga, CCPR/C/SR. 13, para. 11: "he considered whether it was
possible to compare the Committee to a conciliation body." Mr. Suy, the Legal
Counsel, replied "that conciliation was only one aspect of the Committee's work",
Id. at para. 15
9. CCPR/C/SR.7, para. 1. Cp. Mr. Saksena (India), A/C.3/SR.1428, para. 10
who drew attention to the non-judicial character of the Committee. Mr. Nasinovsky
(USSR), A/C.3/SR. 1425, para. 53, felt that "the Committee was not a judicial
body". However, Mr. Egas (Chile), Id. at para. 57, envisaged the possibility that
the Committee might exercise judicial functions.
10. CCPR/C/SR. 13, para. 6
11. Official Records of the GeneralAssembly, 32nd session, Supplement No. 44,
A/32/44, para. 90
12. A/32/44, Annex IV
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A heartening feature of the Committee is its recognition of the
need for a close rapport with the public. The Committee has agreed
that its reports, formal decisions and all other official documents
shall be documents of general distribution unless the Committee
decides otherwise. In its first annual report, the Committee
expressed the opinion that, although the principle of confidentiality
should govern their deliberations when dealing with complaints, a
minimum of information should be made available in its reports
without divulging the contents of the communications, the nature of
the allegations, the identity of the author or the name of the State
party against which the allegations were made. It was felt that the
general public had a legitimate interest in knowing the main trends
in the approach of the Committee in its consideration of
communications. This was in line with the intention of the drafters
of the Covenants who envisaged them "generating information and
focussing public opinion on human rights matters". 13
As regards the Committee's approach to the examination of
reports, it has generally agreed that the main purpose of such
examination should be to assist States parties in the promotion and
protection of the human rights recognized in the Covenant. 14 The
examination of reports considered thus far has been fairly detailed.
Searching questions are asked of the representatives of the
Governments present at the examination such as:
-What was the legal technique of incorporation of the Covenant
into domestic law?
-Whether, and if so under what conditions, an individual could
request the courts or administrative authorities to apply the
Covenant against a law or regulation contrary to its provisions.
-Are there people not convicted of crimes who are detained for
political reasons?
-What is the meaning of the concept of "socialist legality"?
In most instances the Government representative was requested,
and undertook, to provide supplementary information to the
Committee. The Committee's intention, after completing its study
of each State's report, is to call for subsequent reports. The aim of
such further reports will be to bring the situation up to date in
respect of each State.
The committee has drawn up a set of general guidelines regarding
the form and contents of reports to be submitted by States parties in
the future. Among the questions in which it is interested in receiving
13. A/32/44, para. 170
14. Id. at para. 105
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information is whether the provisions of the Covenant can be
invoked before, and directly enforced by, the courts, other tribunals
or administrative authorities, or whether they first have to be
transformed into internal laws and administrative regulations. The
Committee is also interested in knowing of derogations, restrictions
or limitations on the rights contained in the Covenant.
IV. The Relationship Between InternationalLaw and Municipal
Law: Incorporation of the Provisions of the Covenant into
MunicipalLaw
In the Commission on Human Rights in 1948, during the drafting of
the International Covenants on Human Rights, an opinion was
requested of the United Nations Legal Counsel on the following
questions: "Is it proper and permissible for a State which accedes
to, and ratifies an international convention to state that it will
subsequently adapt its municipal law to the provisions of the
Convention, or is it necessary that the adaptation of the municipal
law precede the ratification of the Convention?" The Legal Counsel
replied that ". . . as far as international law is concerned, the
adaptation of municipal law is not a condition precedent to a State
binding itself internationally. A State may properly undertake an
international obligation and then subsequently take the necessary
domestic legislative measures to ensure the fulfilment of the
obligation undertaken." He added, "In considering this matter a
clear distinction must be made between international law and the
requirements of municipal law. It is recognized that under the
municipal law of many countries an international covention or treaty
does not become binding in domestic law or enforceable by the
courts until it has been 'incorporated' or 'transformed' by legislative
action into the municipal law and thus made a part of the law of the
land. This does not affect in any way the international obligation of
the State to carry out the treaty. In other words, even though the
necessary enabling legislation is not enacted the treaty is binding
internationally and there would clearly be a duty to make reparation
for any resulting breach of the obligation.
"The question of the Commission also presents implicitly
another question, namely: If a State has not adapted its municipal
law to the provisions of the Covenant prior to, or at the time of, its
ratification or accession, has it failed to carry out its obligations
under the Covenant? Or, in other words, what is the legal situation
during the interval between the date on which a treaty enters into

12 The Dalhousie Law Journal

force for a particular State and the enactment of the necessary
municipal legislation? In the light of the principles discussed above
the answer to this question is quite clear. A State is under a duty to
execute the provisions of a treaty from the date at which the treaty
becomes binding upon that State. The fact that there may be
omissions or deficiencies in municipal law would not, in
international law, justify the failure of the State to fulfil its treaty
obligations. The only exception to this arises, of course, where the
treaty itself contains a provision that there shall be no duty to carry
out the obligation prior to the enactment of the required municipal
legislation. But where this exception does not exist a party is under
a duty to enact such legislation as may be necessary to carry out the
treaty obligations; consequently, it may not rely on the absence of
such legislation to avoid responsibility for carrying out the
requirements of the treaty. As a corollary to this it may be noted that
the obligation is not discharged by a mere recommendation by the
Executive to the Legislature requesting the necessary legislative
action. In short, the obligation of a State arises at the moment it
becomes a party to the treaty regardless of what its municipal law
may require."
The position that seems to be emerging in the Committee is that
"the method used to integrate the provisions of the Covenant in
domestic law is a matter for each State party to decide in accordance
with its legal system and practice, the essential consideration being
that no domestic system or practice could be invoked as a reason for
failing to implement the Covenant."' 15 During the consideration of
the Danish report, for example, Mr. Ganji, member from Iran, said
that "he shared the view expressed by some members of the
Committee that the provisions of an international treaty did not
necessarily have to be incorporated into domestic law . . . The
incorporation of treaty provisions into domestic law became
necessary only when such provisions were not in keeping with a
pre-existing legal situation." 1G
15. A/33/40, para. 117
16. CCPR/C/SR.54, para. 47. In reply to a question put on the subject by the
Government of the United States, the International Labour Office replied, on
November 13, 1950, that "the competent bodies of the International Labour
Organization have regarded the question of whether or not legislation is, in fact,
necessary to make effective the provisions of such a Convention as being a matter
for decision by each Member of the Organization in the light of its constitutional
practice and its existing law." Similarly, in a letter dated October 18, 1929 sent by
Albert Thomas, the Director, of the International Labour Office, to the
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Members of the Committee are, however, particularly interested
in whether a citizen is able to initiate legal proceedings invoking the
provisions of the Covenant directly and how much weight courts
can give to its provisions. Thus, during the examination of the
Swedish report, Mr. Hanga of Romania, referring to a statement in
the report that it had not been necessary to lay down provisions
equivalent to those of the Covenant in an independent Swedish
statute because existing domestic law was in full accord with the
obligations to be assumed by Sweden under the Covenant, asked
whether it would be possible for an individual to invoke the
provisions of the Covenant before a court or administrative tribunal,
or to call for the annulment of a law which ran counter to the
Covenant under a procedure similar to that used to declare laws
17
unconstitutional.
An interesting point was made by Mr. Tomuschat, member from
the Federal Republic of Germany, who found rather bold the
assertion that "existing Swedish law, save on the three points where
a reservation was made, was in full accord with the obligations
which were to be assumed by Sweden under the Covenant." It
would be interesting, he felt, to know whether there was any
procedure in Sweden under which an individual could lodge a
complaint to the effect that Swedish law was not in harmony with
the Covenant. Even if the two had been in full accord at the time of
ratification, the provisions of the Covenant might well evolve in the
course of their interpretation and application, and care should be
taken to ensure that there was complete consistency at all times
between the international legal order, as embodied in the Covenant
and the domestic legal order. The Swedish Government had chosen
a technique of implementation which consisted of bringing domestic
legislation into line with the Covenant without, however, formally
incorporating the latter into the domestic legal order. In his view,
the rights accorded by the Government to the individual could not
Government of the Irish Free State, in reply to that Government's question
whether, since a rest period of 24 hours was already granted to industrial workers in
Irish practice, the enactment of a law was specifically necessary in order to give
effect to the requirements of articles 2, 3 and 4 of Convention No. 14 of 1921
concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings, it was
pointed out that although the course most usually adopted to secure the effective
application of the Convention was that of passing legislation, Ireland was free to
follow whatever method would in fact ensure effective application of the provisions
of the Convention.
17. CCPR/C/SR.52, para. 30
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be dependent upon the way in which they were incorporated in the
legislation of various countries. Consequently, even in a country
which had not made the covenant part of its domestic law, an
individual should have the right directly to invoke its provisions
before the Courts. Similar views were expressed by Mr. Hanga of
Romania.1 8 Replying to these comments the representative of
Sweden said that his country "accepted the supervision exercised
by the Human Rights Committee." 19 There is a strong tendency in
the Committee in favour of the view that the Covenant should be
made directly applicable in internal law.
Articles 20, 21 and 23 of the draft articles on the law of
international responsibility elaborated by the International Law
Commission are highly pertinent to the issues under discussion.
Article 20 reads: "Breach of an internationalobligationrequiring
the adoption of a particularcourse of conduct: There is a breach by
a State of an international obligation requiring it to adopt a
particular course of conduct when the conduct of that State is not in
conformity Nvith that requixed by that obligatiDn." Artfile 21 reads.
"Breach of an internationalobligation requiringthe achievement of
a specified result: 1. There is a breach by a State of an international
obligation requiring it to achieve, by means of its own choice, a
specified result if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not
achieve the result required of it by that obligation. 2. When the
conduct of the State has created a situation not in conformity with
the result required of it by an international obligation, but the
obligation allows that this or an equivalent result may nevertheless
be achieved by subsequent conduct of the State, there is a breach of
the obligation only if the State also fails by its subsequent conduct to
achieve the result required of it by that obligation." Article 23
reads: "Breach of an internationalobligation to prevent a given
event: When the result required of a State by an international
obligation is the prevention, by means of its own choice, of the
occurrence of a given event, there is a breach of that obligation only
18. CCPR/C/SR/52, para. 38. Cf. para. 70 of the Report of the Committee for
1978 (A/33/40): "Some members asked whether it was possible for an individual
to directly invoke the provisions of the Covenant before a court or administrative
tribunal or to call for the annulment of a law which ran counter to the Covenant."
Also, para. 120: "It was asked whether there existed any means by which an
individual contesting the Government's interpretation of the Covenant could have
his point of view heard and considered." Similarly, para. 412
19. CCPR/C/SR. 53, para. 2
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if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve that result. "20
In the view of the ILC, there are international obligations which
require the State to perform or to refrain from a specifically
determined action and there are other cases in which the
international obligation only requires the State to bring about a
certain situation or result, leaving it free to do so by whatever means
it chooses, Obligations of the first kind are called obligations "of
conduct" or "of means", and those of the second kind obligations
"of result".21 What distinguishes the first type of obligation from
the second is not that obligations "of conduct" or "of means" do
not have a particular object or result, but that their object or result
must be achieved through action, conduct or means "specifically
determined" by the international obligation itself, which is not true
of international obligations of result. However, the specific
determination of the required action which identifies an international obligation as an obligation "of conduct" or "of means" may
vary in its degree of precision. For example, an international
obligation may specify that the State shall enact "a law", or it may
require the State to adopt "legislative measures". In the latter
situation the obligation, while remaining an obligation "of
conduct" or "of means" nevertheless leaves the State some latitude
enabling it to proceed either by enacting a law proper or by some
other normative means peculiar to its legal system. Examples of
international obligations requiring specified legislative action may
be found in human rights treaties. Thus, the Commission cites
article 2, paragraph 1 (c), of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which provides
that "Each State Party shall take effective measures

. . .

to amend,

rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of
creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists." It
also cites article 3a. of the 1960 Convention against Discrimination
in Education, in which States undertake to "abrogate any statutory
provisions and any administrative instructions .

. .

which involve

discrimination in education."
In the opinion of the Commission where the action or omission'
found to have occurred is in fact not in conformity with the conduct
20. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 29th session,
A/32/10 at 20-21
21. This discussion of the position of the International Law Commission is
etropolated from the report of the International Law Commission on the work of
its 29th session. A/32/10 at 20-64
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specifically required of the organ responsible for the action or
omission, there is a direct breach of the obligation in question,
without any other condition being required for such a finding. This
finding is not influenced by the fact that the non-conformity of the
conduct adopted with the conduct which should have been adopted
did or did not have consequences that were actually harmful. The
ILC cites as an example article 10, paragraph 3, of the Interrational
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, which
imposes on a State an obligation to recognize that the employment
of children and young persons "inwork harmful to their morals or
health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal
development should be punishable by law." This obligation, the
ILC asserts, is breached simply by the fact that a law providing for
punishment of such practices has not been enacted, even if no
specific instance of the employment of children in such work is
found in the country concerned. Similarly, if, as in the case of
article 2, paragraph 1 (c), of the 1965 International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a convention
obliges a State to rescind legislative provisions which have the
effect of creating such discrimination, this obligation is breached
simply by the fact that the provisions in question have not officially
been rescinded, even if they would never actually have been applied
or no longer could be.
State practice and international jurisprudence, the ILC adds,
confirm the validity of the above conclusions. From this practice
and jurisprudence it concludes that, where the international
obligation requires from the State a particular course of conduct in
the form of an action or omission on the part of one of its organs, the
conduct of a State organ which is not in conformity with that
required of it by the obligation in question is sufficient to constitute
a breach of the obligation.
International obligations "of result," the Commission continues,
do not require a particular course of conduct on the part of the State
or, in other words, a course of conduct on the part of specified State
organs. It is possible, within the wide and varied range of
international obligations "of result" to make further distinctions
according to the different degrees of permissiveness of these
obligations in regard to the achievement of the result they require.
The permissiveness may, first of all, take the form of an initial.
freedom of choice:
"The permissiveness as to means, which is characteristic of
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international obligations "of result", sometimes extends to giving
the State an opportunity to apply a remedy a posteriorito the effects
of an initial course of conduct which has led to a situation
incompatible with the result required by the obligation. It is thus
possible that international law may require only a final result, not
only leaving the State free to choose the means it will use initially,
but also allowiug it, if it has not achieved the result by the first
means chosen, to resort to other means to that end. Under all
obligations belonging to this second group of obligations "of
result" the State which initially adopted a course of conduct
consisting in acts or omissions incompatible with the result required
of it, is allowed a fresh opportunity to discharge its obligation. In
other words, under certain conditions and in so far as the required
result has not been rendered permanently unattainable by the initial
conduct, such obligations allow the State to remedy the situation
temporarily created and to ensure the same result, albeit belatedly,
by adopting as an exceptional measure a different course of conduct
capable of obliterating the consequences of the initial conduct.
"In the cases mentioned, the possibility of applying a remedy a
posteriori to the adverse effects of a State's initial conduct is
coupled with initial freedom in the choice of means. But that is not
always so. In other cases, the opportunity of still achieving a result
in conformity with that required by the international obligation by
remedying, through different means, the incompatible result
temporarily brought about, is not accorded to the State solely where
it has had initial freedom to choose between various normal means
of discharging the obligation. The State may be given that
opportunity even where it had no such initial freedom of choice. In
such a case, it is, precisely, the faculty of subsequently making
good, by different conduct, the consequences of the initial action or
omission which marks the latitude allowed to the State. ." '22
The Commission points out that there are also cases in which,
when the initial conduct has made the main required result
henceforth unattainable, the international obligation allows the State
to consider itself discharged by achieving an alternative result. The
Commission cites in this connexion article 9, paragraph 1, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. It asserts that the obligation here set out should be read in
22. ld. at 39
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conjunction with paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same article, which
provide respectively that "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a
court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is
not lawful," and that "Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation". This juxtaposition of provisions shows, it feels, that the State
can consider that it has acted in conformity with its international
duties even if, having failed to achieve the main result required by
the obligation stated in article 9, it has nevertheless achieved the
alternative result of making reparation for the injury caused to the
person who suffered wrongful arrest or detention.
According to the Commission the full freedom of choice enjoyed
by the State sometimes derives from the fact that the international
obligation generally requires the State bound by it to take "all
appropriate measures" to achieve a given result, without giving any
indication of what the appropriate measures may be. For example,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination provides in article 2, paragraph 1 that:
"States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms . . ." In other
cases, the freedom of choice accorded to the State is implicit in the
fact that the international obligation only specified the result to be
achieved, the text imposing the obligation making no reference at
all to the means of achieving it. It cites as examples the 1950
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and certain international labour conventions.
The ILC also identifies obligations which, although not requiring
recourse to a specified means, nevertheless indicate a preference for
one means or another. The Commission cites article 2, paragraph 1,
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which provides that "Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take steps . . . with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly
the adoption of legislative measures",. or article 2, paragraph 2, of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
provides that
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"Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect
to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."
Theye. can be no doubt it asserts that in these,cases legslate means
are expressly indicated at the international level as being the most
normal and appropriate for achieving the purposes of the Covenant
in question, though recourse to such means is not specifically or
exclusively required. The State is free to employ some other means
if it so desires, provided that those means also enable it to achieve in
concreto the full realization of the individual rights provided for by
the Covenants.
Illustrating the case of an international obligation which the State
may, in exceptional circumstances, still discharge by resorting to
different means of achieving the required result if the course of
conduct initially adopted has failed, the 1LC mentions instances in
which this further degree of permissiveness is merely an addition to
the normal initial freedom of choice of the means to be used to fulfil
the obligation. Such initial freedom of choice, it asserts, "is
characteristic of, for example, the majority of international
obligations concerning the protection of human rights. When the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that
"Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own"
(article 12, paragraph 2), that "Everyone shall have the right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law" (article 16), or
that "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests" (article 22, paragraph 1), the first
conclusion to be drawn from the very object of these provisions and
from their formulation is that the State is free to adopt whatever
measures it deems most appropriate, in its own particular case, to
guarantee these freedoms and rights to individuals. In the extreme
case it may refrain from adopting any measures at all, provided that
the result is achieved in practice, i.e. that any man or woman who
wishes to leave the country is in fact free to go, that he or she is not
denied recognition as a person before the law, that his or her
freedom of associatien is not obstmeted, and so on. But the
Covenant as a whole points to another conclusion. Assuming, for
example, that the State has chosen to fulfil its obligations by the
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administrative means, an adverse decision concerning the right of
an individual taken by the first authority called upon to rule in
hecognitionis case does not normally make it definitively
impossible for the State to achieve the result internationally required
of it. That result may be considered to have been achieved even if a
higher authority has had to intervene and set aside the first
authority's decision, and only this subseqaent action has secured,
23
for the individual, recognition of the right he sought to exercise.
V. The ExaminationofReports
1. The Approach to Supervision
According to the author of a recent treatise on international
supervision,
Supervision has two aspects: review and correction. The first
aspect bears on the testing of the behaviour of States for its
conformity with international law. The other aspect relates to the
correction or termination of behaviour (an act or an omission)
which is found to be contrary to international law.
Supervision is part of legal technique . .. . (t)he principal
purpose of supervision is to ensure observance of law and regular
functioning of a public service under the conditions laid down by
law. Supervision is an organic task which makes it possible to
rectify errors, either of interpretation or of action, which might
compromise the stability and the security of social existence. It
therefore serves to assure the necessary public order. Supervision
ends when conformity with the rules has been found. When an
irregularity has been found, supervision does not end until a
23. A footnote in the ILC reports adds:
"If any doubt should persist as to the soundness of this conclusion, the fact that
the Covenant contains a clause concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies
(article 41, paragraph I (c)) would suffice to remove it. A similar conclusion
naturally holds good for all obligations imposed by conventions which contain an
explicit clause of this kind, such as the 1950 Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (article 26) and the 1965 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (article 11,
paragraph 3, of article 14, paragraph 7 (a)). The effect of this clause is, precisely,
to prevent the establishment of final failure to achieve the result required of the
State by the obligation which the clause accompanies, so long as it is still possible
to obtain that result by one of the other means at the State's disposal. It would,
however, be wrong to believe that the conclusion stated is justified only in cases
covered by the specific provisions of article 22 of the present draft, where the
agreement from which certain obligations derive contains a clause expressly
providing that the State cannot be charged at the international level with not having
fulfilled its obligations, so long as the available local remedies have not been
exhausted."
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redress has been made which has brought the contested behaviour
In general such a result is
into conformity with the legal rule.
24
achieved by means of persuasion.
As was seen above, the Human Rights Committee strives to
establish a dialogue with Governments and to assist them in
complying with their obligations under the Covenant. At its third
session, held in 1978, the Committee held an exchange of views on
whether, and if so, in what form, it should express its views on the
reports it had considered, to the Governments of the States parties
concerned. It may be recalled that under article 40, paragraph 4 of
the Covenant, the Committee is required to study the reports
submitted by the States parties and to "transmit its reports, and such
general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States
parties." Under article 45 the Committee is required to submit an
annual report on its activities.
Some members of the Committee were of the opinion that the
Committee should, before examining the substance of the reports
submitted by States parties, first satisfy itself that they provided all
the information required under article 66 of its rules of procedure.
Divergent views were expressed as to whether, under article 40,
paragraph 4 of the Covenant, the Committee was under an
obligation to prepare in respect of each report which it examined,
specific reports to the States parties in which it could evaluate the
situation, in law as well as in fact, and make suggestions and
recommendations with a view to promoting the observance and
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant; or whether
the purpose of reporting to the States parties as mentioned under
article 40, paragraph 4, of the Covenant would be served by
reflecting the views of the Committee in its annual report to the
General Assembly under article 45 of the Covenant. Some members
were of the opinion that in its annual report to the General
Assembly, the Committee could only indicate whether or not it was
satisfied with a report submitted by a State party, but could not
indicate that a State party had failed to comply with its obligations
or that certain national actions were contrary to the provisions of the
Covenant.
24. H. A. H. Audretsch, Supervision in EuropeanCommunity Law (1978), at 206.
See generally, Asbeck, F.M. van. "Quelques aspects du contr6le international
non-judiciaire de l'application par les gouvernrnents de conventions
intemationales," Liber amicorum in honour of JPA Frangois (Leyden: 1959), at
27-41
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Market Law Review, at 7-13.
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The members of the Committee were, however, generally in
agreement that regardless of methods to be formulated and followed
in its examination of reports, such methods should be motivated by
the firm belief of the Committee that a fruitful and constructive
dialogue with States parties was essential for the realization of the
rights and freedoms provided for in the Covenant; that it was
premature, at this early stage of the Committee's experience, to
formulate rigid methods for examining reports from States parties;
and that information on the experience and methods of other bodies
engaged in similar supervisory functions, such as the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the ILO's
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, could prove to be useful for that purpose. In this
connection the Committee was provided with information on the
procedures and methods of work followed by the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its examination of reports
and information submitted to it by States parties under article 9 of
the International Covention on the Elimination of All Forms of
25
Racial Discrimination.
The Committee has, so far, not forwarded any 'general
comments', to States parties whose reports it has examined. Neither
has it made such comments in its annual report to the General
Assembly. Its annual reports contain descriptions of the consideration of each State's report, questions asked by individual members
and additional information requested by them.
2. The Standardof Supervision
In a round-up on its fifty years of experience in the supervising of
the implementation of international labour standards, the ILO
Tammes, A.J.P. "The Ensurance of Community Law By the National Judge;
Individual Legal Protection in the European Communities,'"EM 1 (Deventer 1964)
157-166
Usher, J.A. "The Influence of National Concepts on Decisions of the European
Court" (1976), Euorpean Law Reviewt at 359-374
Valticos, N. "Un syst~me de contrble international: la mise en oeuvre des
conventions internationales du travail", duRCADI, t. 123 (1968-1), 311-407;
"Apregu de certains grands probl~ms du contrfle international (sp~ciaIement
propos des conventions internationales du travail)", Milanges MARIDAKIS
(Athbnes 1964), vol. I1, 543-586
Herbert, J. "Le nouveau syst~me de contrfle de s~curit6", RTDE 1977, 282-291
Nafilyan, G. "La position des 6tats membres et les recours en manquements",
RTDE 1977, 214-243
25. For the discussion of these issues see CCPR/C/SR.48, 49, 50, 55 and 73
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Committee of Experts on the Application of Standards emphasized
in 1977 that its "function is to determine whether the requirements
of a given convention are being met, whatever the economic and
social conditions exisiting in a given country." "These are
international standards," it added, "and the manner in which their
implementation is evaluated must be uniform and must not be
affected by concepts derived from any particular economic or social
system".26 In similar vein, in 1977 the General Assembly in a
resolution adopted after consideration of the first annual report of
the Human Rights Committee, appreciated that the Committee
"strives for uniform standards of implementation of the Covenant".
During the study of the Swedish report in the Human Rights
Committee, however, the representative of Sweden expressed the
view "that no uniform world-wide solutions could be found to all
the problems which States have to deal with in their reports under
article 40 of the Covenant".27 Asked what was meant by a
"democratic society" in chapter 2, section 12 of the Swedish
constitui a, he replied that "'that concept must be interpreted in the
light of the Swedish Constitution". 28
It is apparent that we are here in a delicate area involving the
reconciliation of uniform standards of implementation with
diversity of methods for implementing the Covenant. The
Committee's records so far show that it has not yet had to pronounce
itself on this matter. So far it has merely undertaken the first
examination of reports and requested additional information. The
issue may arise when it returns to these reports and begins to
evaluate them. It is, however, an important issue to be watched in
the future. To illustrate the type of problem that might be
encountered, let us cite the question of the standard for determining
the independence of judges. During the study of the Libyan report,
for example, one member observed that the principle of legality was
dependent on the existence, in accordance with article 14 of the
Covenant, of independent and impartial courts and wished to know
how judges were appointed, whether they were appointed for life or
could be dismissed, and, if they could, by what authority. Another
member of the Committee noted, however, that the best means of
26. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations to the 63rd session of the International Labour Conference
(1977), at 12-13
27. CCPR/C/SR.53, para. 2
28. Id.
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guaranteeing the independence of the courts and judges consisted
not so much in appointing judges for life as in giving every citizen
the possibility of becoming a judge. 29 Will the Committee need,
eventually, to reconcile these two approaches?
Although there are few instances where the Committee has thus
far pronounced itself on general standards of supervision, individual
members of the Committee have offered their views on the matter.
Thus, according to Mr. Movchan, "the Committee . .. had an

obligation to consider not only the measures already adopted by
States in order to fulfil their obligations under the Government, but
also the progress achieved in that respect". 30
During the consideration of the Byelorussian report, Mr.
Tomuschat noted that
the meetings being held by the Committee marked a
turning-point in the history of human rights: for the first time, a
procedure had been established which applied to the States of all
regions in the world, irrespective of the ideological and political
differences separating them, and which was designed to exercise,
through a friendly 1and constructive dialogue a kind of
international control .3

The Committee was not an international court but was similar to one
in certain respects, particularly in regard to its obligation to be
guided exclusively by legal criteria - which rightly distinguished it
from a political body. Its function was to improve the human rights
performance of all countries, mainly by bringing into the open the
deficiencies of their systems and thereby perhaps causing States to
review their position and to correct situations that were not in
accordance with the provisions of the Covenant. 32 On an earlier
occasion Mr. Tomuschat expressed the view that the Committee
"alone could find a common denominator in the different concepts
of the exercise of human rights and ensure that the Covenant was
29. Report of the Committee, 1978, A/33/40, para. 58; CCPR/C/SR.5 1, paras. 44
and 69
30. CCPR/C/SR. I11, para. 13
31. Cf. Mr. Opsahl, CCPR/C/SR.109, para. 9: The report of the USSR
"represented a milestone in the history of the international protection of human
rights, for its submission had given the lie to the pessimists who had asserted that
the socialist states, and particularly the USSR, would never submit to international
supervision of the implementation of civil and political rights within their territories
and it marked the beginning of a new era of co-operation in the implementation of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
32. CCPR/C/1 17, para. 35
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being applied in a consistent manner".
Mr. Graefrath has expressed the view that the obligation upon
States parties under article 2 was
sufficiently broad to allow States with different social systems to
co-operate in the field of human rights and did not raise any
political system to the level of a model which alone would make
it possible to fulfil the obligations deriving from the Covenant.
The Committee's role was not to assess the situation of different
States, commending some and condemning others for their
policies in the matter of civil and political rights; the international
community had established other procedures for that purpose.
Under article 40, the Committee's task was to study the reports
submitted by States parties and 34to encourage States to implement
the provisions of the Covenant.
However,
Article 2 of the Covenant did not confine itself to requesting
States to refrain from infringing human rights but laid an
obligation on them to ensure respect for those rights. A State used
its power when it took life by imposing the death penalty, but it
also used it when it did nothing, or not enough, to reduce infant
mortality. It was, of course, necessary to take account of the
economic and technical possibilities of States, but what was
important for the Committee was that mere formal recognition of
a right without practical measures for its implementation was not
to the fight to life, set forth in
enough and it was only in relation
35
article 6, that that was true."
3. Fact-finding
During the consideration of the Danish report, a member of the
Committee noted that in considering the reports discussed so far, the
33. CCPR/C/SR.109, para47
34. CCPR/C/SR. 117, para. 52
35. CCPR/C/SR. 117, para. 54, Cf. the International Law Commission: "What
matters is that the result required by the obligation should in fact be achieved; if it is
not, a breach has been comitted, whatever measures are taken by the State. We
have seen for example that article 2, paragraph 1, of the 1965 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination provides that
"States parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in
all its forms . • .". Now it is obvious that, if the administrative authorities of a
State party to the Convention in fact commit acts of racial discrimination, the State
will not escape the consequence of being charged with a breach of the Convention
by taking refuge behind some law which it may have enacted prohibiting such acts.
It is not sufficient to enact a law because, if a practice contrary to the obligation is
continued in, the result intended by the obligation is not achieved in concreto".
Report of the ILC on the work of its 29th session, A/32/10, at 59.
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Committee had been dealing with prevailing legal situations and
trying to determine whether those situations were in keeping with
the provisions of the Covenant. He felt, however, that the
Committee should be more interested in finding out what the factual
situation was in the States parties to the Covenant. States parties
might actually be applying their domestic laws in ways that were
fully consistent with the provisions of the Covenant, but the
Committee could never be absolutely sure whether that was so
unless it received reports dealing with the de-facto situation in those
States, not the legal situation. He was, therefore, of the opinion that
the guidelines which the Committee requested States parties to
follow in the submission of their reports had to go farther than they
36
did at present.
Going beyond the legal facade is a task that the Committee has
not yet had time to deal with, but it may prove in the long term to be
one of the most challenging parts of its responsibilities.
4. InternationalControl
In its consideration of reports, the Committee is, so far, still at the
stage of 'review' and has not yet reached the stage of 'control' in
respect of any State party. Although individual members of the
Committee have on occasions expressed the view that some parts of
the reports examined seemed to indicate contradictions of the
Covenant, the Committee itself has not yet approached such a
pronouncement. Up to its fifth session it had had only one instance
of a second report presented by a State party. In that instance it was
felt desirable not to follow the procedure hitherto adopted for initial
reports and to concentrate instead on certain particular points. In
order to achieve more orderly deliberations, it was suggested that
members should concentrate on a limited number of points since the
Committee had already spent considerable time examining the
report in questions (Ecuador). The members who wished to do so
were invited to inform the Chairman in advance of those aspects
which they would particularly like to be dealt with, so that they
37
could be brought to the attention of the Committee as a whole.
Some members did provide such lists of questions which were put to
the representative of the Government who thereupon replied to
them. The Committee did not make any further pronouncements at
36. Mr. Ganji, CCPR/C/SR.54, at paras. 48-50
37. CCPR/C/SR. 117, para. 60
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the end of this second phase. 38
5. Reservations
It is a clear principle of international law that a State, upon ratifying
or acceding to a treaty, may enter reservations provided that they do
not negate the essential object and purpose of the treaty. Assuming
that the latter poNiso has been satisfied, is a body zhaged with
supervising the implementation of the treaty entitled to question the
reservations entered by a State party? This is an issue which arose
early in the Committee. In considering the report of Finland, some
members of the Committee expressed the view that some of the
reservations made by it were not really necessary and feared that too
many reservations may distort the meaning of the Covenant. They
stressed that under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
(1969), a State may not make reservations incompatible with the
essential object and purpose of a treaty. Other members, however,
were of the view that ratification and implementation of the
Covenant with reservations is better than its non-ratification. In
their opinion the making of reservations may usefully clarify the
legal situation wherever there was an obvious discrepancy between
the Covenant and existing domestic legislation.
An interesting approach was taken on another report by Mr.
Movchan of the USSR. Commenting on Sweden's reservation to
article 20, paragraph 1, of the Covenant pertaining to the
prohibition of war propaganda, he asked
whether Sweden intended to enact legislation to eliminate the
contradiction between international law and domestic law
constituted by its reservation to that article. The speedy
enactment of such legislation would enable Sweden to fulfil its
international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations
and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which
prohibited war and the threat or use of force, which were fraught
with war propaganda. 3 9
Similarly, Messrs. Hanga and Koulishev regretted that the Swedish
Government had found it necessary to enter a reservation to article
20 because, they pointed out, war propaganda was prohibited under
several international instruments. They hoped that the Government
38. CCPR/C[SR.118
39. CCPR/C/SR.52, para. 15
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would find it possible to withdraw its reservation. 4 Here we see a
reservation being challenged on the ground that it was inconsistent
with international customary law.
An interesting issue which has not yet been discussed in the
Committee is the permissibility of reservations to rights referred to
in article 4 of the Covenant. It may be recalled that this article
provides that no derogations should be made to certain rights
enumerated therein. In its instrument of adherence the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany entered a reservation to article
15 (1), one of the articles in respect of which no derogation is
permissible under article 4.41 Is a reservation to a right from which
no derogation is possible compatible with the object and purposes of
the Covenant? It will be interesting to see the Committee's reaction
42
to this question.

6. The iter-dependence and Indivisibility of Civil and Political
Rights and Economic, Social and CulturalRights and the Relevance
of Economic and Social Conditions
In its report to the Committee, the Government of the German
Democratic Republic asserted that the basic economic and social
rights were the decisive precondition for the full implementation of
civil and political rights. This led to an interesting exchange in the
Committee. According to one viewpoint, it was more accurate to
say that the full enjoyment of civil and political rights might depend
on the degree to which economic, social and cultural rights were
enjoyed, in view of the more immediate character of the basic
obligation embodied in article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights as compared with that of article 2 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
On the other hand, some members expressed full agreement with
the basic premise in the report and reference was made in this
respect to the relevant paragraph of General Assembly resolution
32/130 of 16 December 1977 which stated that the full "realization
of civil and political rights, without the enjoyment of economic,
40. Id., at paras. 31,35
41. See CCPR/C/2, at 5
42. On reservations to the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, see United Nations document CERD/C/R.93 29 July 1976: Reservations, Declarations and Statements of Interpretation Made by
States Parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Note by the Secretary-General
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social and cultural rights is impossible." Thus, Mr. Ganji pointed
out that: "it should be borne in mind that the views of over
two-thirds of the world's inhabitants could not be articulated
through the Committee, which was a restricted body of experts. He
fully shared the views expressed by Mr. Prado Vallejo and Mr.
Opsahl concerning the interdependence of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, which were in fact inseparable. In order to
exercise any of the rights with which the Committee was concerned,
an individual had to exist and, in order to exist, he must die neither
before nor after birth and he must receive a minimum of food,
education, health care, housing and clothing. There was undoubtedly an interconnexion between the right to life, the requirements
of which were material, and the right to exercise all other freedoms.
"The reason for which there were two Covenants on human rights
were well known. At the outset, there had been only one draft
covenant, but the cold war and the views of two separate groups of
States had led to the adoption of two texts, the interdependence of
which was nevertheless borne out by the almost indentical wording
of the third preambular paragraph of each.
"The need to adopt a realistic approach to the issues with which the
Committee was concerned could not be overstressed. Twenty-five
of the 45 States parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
were Asian, African or Latin American States. While those States
must certainly comply with the obligations they had assumed, it
should be clearly understood that even the most perfect laws could
not be applied unless a proper legal infrastructure existed and unless
there were judges and administrators who understood the full import
of the rights they were required to protect.
"Had the international community been adopting the Covenants
today, the result would certainly be one instrument instead of two.
In that connection, he drew attention to General Assembly
resolution 32/130 which had been adopted on 16 December 1977 by
123 votes to none, with 15 abstentions. Forty-two of the 45 States
parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had voted in
favour of that resolution, the eleventh preambular paragraph of
which stated that the continuing existence of an unjust international
economic order constituted 'a major obstacle to the realization of
the economic, social and cultural rights in developing countries.'
Furthermore, paragraph I (a) of the resolution stated that all human
rights and fundamental freedoms were indivsible and interdependent. That was reality, and he was not prepared to accept anything

Emerging Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee 31

else. The resolution went on to state, in paragraph 1 (b) that 'The
full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights is impossible.'
It would be the States parties themselves that would determine the
fate of the Committee's deliberations, and they would be attentive
to the approach adopted by the Committee to the performance of its
task. He did not wish to suggest that underdevelopment could be a
pretext for permitting torture and inequality; indeed, certain of the
rights embodied in the Covenant did not depend entirely upon the
level of development reached in a country, even though an
administrative and judicial infrastructure as well as properly
educated judges, lawyers and administrators were required in order
to put into effect any system of justice. However, the Covenant was
also concerned with a certain number of rights and freedoms which
could not be exercised in the absence of an adequate social and
economic infrastructure. "3
An interesting case arose during the examination of the report of
Libya. One member, Mr. Hanga of Romania, asked: "Did the
provisions of the Covenant really form an integral part of the
national legal system and was their implementation faciliated by the
prevailing social and economic conditions?" 44 Mr. Graefrath of the
German Democratic Republic felt that "it would be useful for the
Committee to know what were the achievements of the Libyan
revolution, whether structural changes had been made in society and
legislation, and if so, whether those changes had had any effects on
human rights." ' 45 Mr. Movchan of the USSR thought that "the
report and the explanations given by the representative of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya bore witness to significant economic and
social changes in that country intended to satisfy the fundamental
needs of the individual and to ensure observance of the international
instruments relating to human rights.' '46
Another interesting case arose during the study of the Swedish
report. Mr. Tomuschat of the Federal Republic of Germany,
referring to article 19 of the Covenant which guarantees the right to
freedom of expression, drew attention to a statement made in the
Swedish report that freedom of expression and information may be
restricted in the interests of the security of the realm and of the
43.
44.
45.
46.

CCPR/C/SR.67, paras. 78-82
CCPR[C/SR.51, para. 58
Ibid., para. 56
CCPR/C/SR. 51, para. 72
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economic well-being of the people. He asked whether any public
acts had been based on that reservation. For example, if an
economist stated that the Swedish economy was not as sound as
claimed by the Government, could his scientific statement be
prohibited on the grounds that it might be detrimental to the
economic well-being of the people? 4 7 Several other members made
the same point. The Swedish represetative reptied that the
expression "economic well-being of the people" in the Swedish
constitution related to grounds for discrimination which were
applicable only in the event of a serious crisis; it would certainly not
be used in order to censor economists, for example. That criterion
would, in fact, be applied in only one of the situations referred to in
article 5 of the Covenant. He added that no law had been passed
under which the economic well-being of the people could be
48
invoked to justify discrimination.
The report of Madagascar is of particular interest to the present
issue. In introducing the report before the Committee, the
representative of that country pointed out that the promotion of civil
and political rights in his country had been hampered by the lack of
judicial facilities, the sharp rise in crime and the worsening of the
economic situation as a result of the world economic crisis. The last
two factors necessitated the adoption of measures restricting the
enjoyment of certain rights and freedoms in order to protect society
and the economic order. These measures included, according to
ordinances issued in 1976 and 1977, the suspension of the
publication of newspapers and periodicals guilty of disturbing
public order, of undermining national unity or of offences against
public morality; the establishment of six special economic courts
and special criminal courts aimed at controlling the crime wave. He
also referred to two ordinances that had been enacted as exceptional
measures to restrict the movement, or fix the residence, of persons
regarded as a threat to public order or known to engage in acts of
banditry. He pointed out, however, that the resort to these two
measures, had been very rare. The report of the Committee to the
General Assembly stated simply that the members of the Committee
"expressed their appreciation for the straightforward manner in
which the representative of Madagascar had explained the
difficulties that his country had encountered in guaranteeing the
47. CCPR/C/SR. 52, para. 43
48. CCPR/C/SR.53, paras. 21, 44
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rights and freedoms laid down in the Covenant.' ' 4 9 It would be
unfortunate if such a position were to be accepted without the most
careful scrutiny.
The consideration of the report of Iran is also instructive.
Commenting on a statement in the Iranian report to the effect that
certain cultural, economic, geographic and religious factors had
made it difficult for the Iranian Government to attain effective
implementation of all the provisions of the Covenant, one member
of the Committee observed that the absence of a provision in Iranian
legislation relating to the prohibition of war propaganada, or the fact
that certain judgements were not subject to appeal to a higher court,
seemed to indicate that there were cases where the failure to
implement certain provisions of the Covenant could not be
attributed to those factors. 50
The members of the Committee as a whole are duly mindful of the
interdependence and indivisibility of civil and political rights and
economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, during the consideration
of the report of Mauritius, Mr. Tomuschat stated that "civil and
political rights must be enjoyed together with economic, social and
cultural rights, since both categories formed an inseparable whole
within which a balance had to be struck." 5 1 Similarly, during the
consideration of the report of Ecuador, Mr. Opsahl stated that the
Committee should "focus attention on the indivisibility of all
human rights - economic, social and cultural on the one hand, and
civil and political on the other. The Committee should stress the
interdependence of those rights, and might consider undertaking or
sponsoring a study showing how, in a country like Ecuador, the
exercise of such rights as the right to health and the right to
education was directly linked to the implementation of civil and
52
political rights."
VI The ExaminationofPetitionsunder the OptionalProtocol
With regard to its work under the Optional Protocol a number of
procedural and substantive issues which have been the subject of
decisions by the Committee are recorded in its two annual reports.
Four significant decisions are indicated in its first report.5 3 First, as
49. A/33/40, para. 26
50. A/33/40, para. 15

51. CCPR/C/SR.110, para. 4
52. CCPR/C/SR. 118, para. 36

53. A/33/44
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to the role of lawyers in representing complainants, the Committee
has decided that normally complaints should be submitted by the
individual himself or by his representative but that it may consider a
communication submitted on behalf of an alleged victim by others
when it appears that he is unable to submit the communication
himself (para. 67). Second, as to the exhaustion of prior remedies,
the Committee adopted the view that it may, under Article 5 (2) of
the Protocol, consider a communication where the application of
remedies is unreasonably prolonged either at the national or
international level (pars. 68-72). Third, Rule 86 of the Committee's
rules of procedure provides for the indication of interim measures to
avoid irreparable damage to the victim of an alleged violation.
Fourth, the Committee has decided that individual opinions may be
appended to its views on complaints submitted to it.
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Four significant decisions are also recorded in its second report.
These decisions concern first, the standing of the author of the
communication and particularly the circumstances in which one
individual may submit a communicatiou on behalf of another
individual; secondly, the considerations that arise from the fact that
the Covenant and the Optional Protocol became binding on the
States parties concerned as from a certain date; thirdly, the
provision in article 5(2)(a) of the Protocol which requires the
committee to ascertain that the same matter is not being examined
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement;
and fourthly, the provision in article 5(2)(b) of the Protocol which
requires the Committee to ascertain that the individual has
exhausted all available domestic remedies.
1. The Standing of the Author
Article I of the Optional Protocol provides that the Committee can
receive communications from individuals who claim to be victims
of violations of the rights set forth in the Covenant. In the
Committee's view this does not mean that the individual must sign
the communication himself in every case. He may also act through a
duly appointed representative and there may be other cases in which
the author of the communication may be accepted as having the
authority to act on behalf of the alleged victim. For these reasons
rule 90(l)(b) of the Committee's provisional rules of procedure
provides that normally the communication should be submitted by
54. A133/40
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the alleged victim himself or by his representative (e.g. the alleged
victim's lawyer), but the Committee may accept a communication
submitted on behalf of an alleged victim when it appears that he is
unable to submit the communication himself. The Committee
regards close family connexion as a sufficient link to justify an
author acting on behalf of an alleged victim. On the other hand, it
had declined to consider communications where the authors have
failed to establish any link between themselves and the alleged
victims.
2. ConsiderationsArising From the Fact That the Covenant and
the Optional Protocol Became Binding on the States Parties as
From a CertainDate
The Committee has declared communications inadmissible, if the
events complained about took place prior to the entry into force of
the Covenant and the Optional Protocol for the State parties
concerned. However, a reference to such events may be taken into
consideration if the author claims that the alleged violations have
continued after the date of entry into force of the Covenant and the
Optional Protocol for the State party concerrned, or that they have
had effects which themselves constitute a violation after that date.
Events which took place prior to the critical date may indeed be an
essential element of the complaint resulting from alleged violations
which occurred after that date.
3. The Application ofArticle 5(2) (a)of the OptionalProtocol
Article 5( 2 )(a) of the Optional Protocol provides that the Committee
shall not consider any communication from an individual "unless it
has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement". In
connection with the consideration of some of the communications
which have been submitted under the Optional Protocol, the
Committee has recognized that cases considered by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights under the instruments
governing its functions were under examination in accordance with
another procedure of international investigation or settlement within
the meaning of article 5(2)(a). On the other hand, the Committee
has determined that the procedure set up under the Economic and
Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII) does not constitute a
procedure of international investigation or settlement within the
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meaning of article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol, since it is
concerned with the examination of situations which appear to reveal
a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights and a
situation is not "the same matter" as an individual complaint. The
Committee has also determined that article 5(2)(a) of the Protocol
can only relate to procedures implemented by inter-State or
intergovernmental organizations on the basis of inter-State or
intergovernmental agreements or arrangements. Procedures established by non-governmental organizations, as for example the
procedure of the Inter-Parliamentary Council of the InterParliamentary Union, cannot, therefore, bar the Committee from
considering communications submitted to it under the Optional
Protocol.
With regard to the application of article 5 ( 2 )(a) of the Optional
Protocol the Committee has further determined that it is not
precluded from considering a communication, although the same
matter has been submitted under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement, if it has been withdrawn from oT is no
longer being examined under the latter procedure at the time that the
Committee reaches a decision on the admissibility of the
communication submitted to it.
In the course of its consideration of communications, the
committee became aware of a language discrepancy in the text of
article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol. The English, French,
Russian and Chinese texts of the article provided that the Committee
shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it
has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement,
whereas the Spanish text of the article employs language meaning
"has not been examined". The Committee has ascertained that this
discrepancy stemmed from an editorial oversight in the preparation
of the final version of the Spanish Text of the Optional Protocol.
Accordingly, the Committee had decided to base its work in respect
of article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol on the English, French,
Russian and Chinese language versions.
To ensure efficient and expeditious implementation of the
provisions of article 5(2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, the
Committee has requested the Secretariat to engage in such exchange
of information with other international bodies and their representative secretariats, as may be necessary to enable the Committee to
ascertain whether the same matter as that submitted to the
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Committee under the Optional Protocol is being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement. The
Committee has recorded its sincere appreciation for the helpful
co-operation received in this connection from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the European Commission of
Human Rights.
4. The applicationof article5(2)(b) of the OptionalProtocol
Article 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol provides that the
Committee shall not consider any communication from an
individual unless it has ascertained that all available domestic
remedies have been exhausted. The Committee considers that this
provision should be interpreted and applied in accordance with the
generally accepted principles of international law with regard to the
exhaustion of domestic remedies as applied in the field of human
rights. If the State party concerned disputes the contention of the
author of a communication that all available domestic remedies
have been exhausted, the State party is required to give details of the
effective remedies available to the alleged victim in the particular
circumstance of his case. In this connection the Committee has
deemed insufficient a general description of the rights available to
accused persons under the law and a general description of the
domestic remedies designed to protect and safeguard these rights.
At its third session the Committee adopted an amendment to its
provisional rules or procedure, by adding a paragraph to rule 93
concerning the procedures for the consideration of communications.
The new paragraph, rule 93(4), provides that a decision declaring a
communication admissible under the Optional Protocol may be
reviewed at a later stage in the light of any explanations or
statements submitted by the State party under article 4(2) of the
Protocol. At the same time the Committee revised the wording of
the first sentence of the following rule, rule 94, to take into account
the new rule 93(4).
Under rule 91(l) of the provisional rules of procedure, the
Committee or a Working Group established under rule 89 may
request the State party concerned or the author of a communication
to submit additional written information of observations relevant to
the questin af admissibility f- a commuicatiDn. At its fourth
session the Committee agreed that, in order to expedite the
consideration of communications, a Working Group could
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henceforth apply rule 91(1) of the provisional rules of procedure,
without placing its decision relating thereto before the Committee
for approval.
With regard to the question of compliance with various
time-limits (normally four to six weeks) established by decisions of
the Committee or its Working Group under the provisional rules of
procedure requesting States parties or authors of communications to
submit information, comments or observations, the Committee
agreed that a reasonable degree of flexibility was called for, to take
into account, for instance, delays in the despatch and delivery of
mail. On the other hand, the Committee has no authority to depart
from the time-limit of six months laid down in article 4(2) of the
Optional Protocol and it must require States parties to comply with
it.
In order to assist individuals who wish to submit communications
to the Committee under the Optional Protocol, the Committee has
authorized the Secretariat to draw up and make use of guidelines
and a model form of communications as appropriate. It is however
explained to the individuals concerned that they are not obliged to
use the model form which is merely intended to serve as a guide to
facilitate their task.
VII Conclusions
The following conclusions may be offered:
(1) The Human Rights Committee is pursuing a pragmatic
approach, duly mindful of judicial, fact-finding, conciliation,
diplomatic and political elements in its functions.
(2) It is possible to detect a quasi-legal approach in the
Committee. Issues which are purely legal have to be approached
accordingly. So far, individual members of the Committee have
taken positions on such legal issues but the Committee as a whole
has pronounced on very few of them.
(3) The Committee seeks to build up a dialogue with
Governments with a view to assisting them to comply with their
obligations under the Covenant.
(4) The practice of the Committee is too short to enable a
conclusion as to whether it intends to follow a firm or a flexible
approach to the question of compliance by Governments with the
provisions of the Covenant. The Committee has not yet had to
decide on any core issues of principle or policy. It is still at the stage
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of 'review' and has not yet approached the stage of 'control'. For
the time being it is probably preferable for the Committee to adopt a
flexible position, without compromising its position.
(5) It will be interesting to observe how the Committee manages
to strike a balance between uniform standards of implementation of
the Covenant and the diversity of States parties, including their
levels of developmentt.
(6) There are discernible differences between the approaches of
'Western' members of the Committee and 'Socialist' members from
the East European countires. This was seen, for example, in
differing criteria for testing the idependence of the judiciary. Will
the Committee need to take a position on such issues? However the
East-West encounter of ideas in the Committee could lead to
cross-fertilization and enrichment of the human rights concept.
(7) It can be said that the Committee is following a fairly liberal
policy in applying the provisions of the Covenant and the Protocol.
(8) Returning to the standards for testing the performance of the
Committee which were suggested by the Canadian representative
and to which reference was made at the beginning of this paper, is
the Committee carrying out its tasks in a 'searching and critical
fashion'?
-As for the examination of reports the answer is 'YES'
- As for analysis, the answer is 'NOT YET'
-As for appraisaland evaluation, the answer is 'NOT YET'
-As to whether the Committee is carrying out it tasks in a
'searchingfashion', the answer is 'YES'
-As to whether the Committee is carrying out its tasks in a
'criticalfashion',the answer is 'LITTLE SO FAR'.
The issues examined in this article suffice to demonstrate that the
practice of the Human Rights Committee has significant implications for the theory of international law and relations. For the first
time in the history of the international community, governmental,
political and legal systems of States Parties are being tested for their
compliance with international human rights standards, irrespective
of the ideology or social system of the country concerned. In their
examination of the reports submitted by States parties, members of
the Human Rights Committee have scrutinized national legislation
to see that they are in compliance with the Covenant, to see that the
substance of the Covenant is embodied in national legislation and
invokable before national courts, and to see that governmental
institutions do not operate in such a manner as may lead to breaches
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of human rights guarantees. Techniques of incorporation of
international treaties in national legislation have also been subject to
scrutiny.
The Committee has examined the relationship of international
law and municipal law and may have to decide in the future whether
States whose legislations provide for priority of municipal over
international law are in compliance with the Covenant should it turn
out that in particular instances national law is not in accordance with
the Covenant. Another area where new ground is being entered in
international law is the question of reservations. As was seen above,
in the consideration of the reports members of the Committee have
questioned the need for some reservations entered into by States
parties and whether or not they were compatible with the Covenant.
In other instances, for example regarding the prohibition of war
propaganda, members of the Committee have expressed the view
that a reservation to this provision of the Covenant is of no effect
since the prohibition of war progaganda is part of customary
international law. Members of the Committee have also questioned
limitations imposed by some States parties on the enjoyment of
human rights.
The General Assembly has expressed its appreciation of the
Committee's efforts to strive for uniform standards of supervision in
examining the reports of States parties. How will this principle of
uniformity of the standards of supervision be reconciled with
countries at different levels of economic and social development?
What is the relevance of economic and social conditions in this
context?
All of this indicates that we are here in an area of development
where the whole theory of international law and relations is coming
under practical scrutiny and where the point de depart is the
international law of human rights. Some pertinent questions may be
posed in this regard: What will the Covenants mean for the law
schools of States parties and their curricula? What will it mean for
the content of teaching syllabuses and programmes? Will it not be
necessary to evolve a human rights theory of law and human rights
approaches to particular branches of the law?

